Publication date: 17 October 2026
President Donald Trump has signed an executive order implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act—and simultaneously waived the new law’s principal sanctions, restrictions and duties. The result is a framework that exists in law but will not yet exert the economic pressure Congress designed it to apply.
The Act, signed on 18 September, provides sanctions against foreign persons and steep duties linked to Russian trade. The executive order sets out a 500% tariff on goods from Russia and 100% duties on goods from the five largest purchasers of Russian oil and gas, as well as the five largest facilitators of sanctions evasion. It then invokes the law’s national-interest waiver to suspend those duties and a broad list of sanctions until the president—or designated cabinet officials—decides further action is appropriate.
The order does not erase earlier sanctions imposed under separate executive authorities. Nor does it repeal the Graham Act. Instead, it preserves the machinery while postponing its application and instructs the US Trade Representative, alongside the State, Treasury and Energy departments, to monitor Russian energy purchases and sanctions evasion.
A sanction can have value before it is used
The administration can argue that keeping the measures available creates leverage. Governments and companies buying Russian energy must now account for the possibility that very large duties could be activated later. Monitoring may also improve the information available for targeted action.
But a suspended penalty is credible only if counterparties believe it may be imposed. An open-ended waiver creates uncertainty about the threshold for activation and the objectives that enforcement is meant to achieve. That can make the instrument flexible, but also allows commercial and diplomatic interests to compete with the pressure Congress intended.
The political issue is therefore not simply whether the president possesses waiver authority; the statute explicitly provides it. The deeper question is whether broad waivers convert a mandatory-looking sanctions package into a discretionary bargaining tool. Congress can legislate severe consequences, yet their practical force still depends on executive certification, monitoring and timing.
Energy prices and Ukraine policy are colliding
The decision follows Trump’s announcement of a US agreement to purchase Russian diesel as part of an effort to lower energy prices. That places two objectives in visible tension: restricting revenue that supports Russia’s war against Ukraine and easing costs for consumers and industry.
For allies, predictability may matter as much as severity. Sanctions work through coordinated expectations across banks, traders, insurers and governments. If enforcement can change rapidly, partners may hesitate to restructure supply chains or expose themselves to retaliation.
The leadership test is to articulate conditions. If the waiver is meant to support negotiations or stabilise energy markets, the administration should explain what developments would cause measures to be imposed, narrowed or permanently withdrawn. Without those benchmarks, monitoring risks becoming a substitute for policy.
The order demonstrates the difference between statutory power and applied pressure. Congress has created a formidable sanctions instrument. The president now controls when—and whether—it becomes economically real.